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This paper estimates the effect of offering an expedited citizenship application process to non-
citizens for joining the U.S. military.  Executive Order (EO) 13269, enacted in July of 2002, 
allowed non-citizens to apply for U.S. citizenship immediately upon joining the military, 
effectively reducing the waiting time that is required to apply for citizenship from three years to 
one day.  We identify the effect of the policy by using administrative personnel data on the 
universe of military enlistees between 1999 and 2010 along with a difference-in-differences 
strategy that uses accessions amongst citizens as the control group.  Overall, we find no effect of 
the offer of expedited citizenship on total accessions amongst non-citizens.  However, this 
overall null effect masks significant shifts of non-citizen enlistments out of combat intensive 
services and into “safer” services.  These results provide the first empirical evidence about this 
important, and relatively costless, recruiting policy. 
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A fully manned fighting force is vital to national security, yet is a costly necessity.  For example, 
each year the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) must replace approximately 11 percent of 
military personnel (about 160,000 troops) due to normal workforce turnover, spending 
approximately $11,000 to recruit each new soldier (Department of Defense, 2013).  Reducing 
these recruitment costs is the subject of much and varied policy debate, yet the vast majority of 
suggested policies involve considerable monetary outlay, whether through the use of signing 
bonuses, retention bonuses, or general advertising campaigns.  In this paper, we study a unique 
recruiting policy that was intended to increase military enlistments with no direct monetary 
outlay: offering non-citizen permanent residents the ability to expedite the citizenship process by 
joining the military.  
 Specifically, we study Executive Order (EO) 13269, which, on July 3, 2002, reduced the 
waiting time to apply for citizenship for military service members from three years of honorable 
service to one day of service (Department of Justice, 2013).  That is, after July 3, 2002, a non-
citizen could immediately apply for citizenship upon enlistment in the military.  Using 
administrative data from the U.S. military and citizens as a comparison group, we estimate the 
effect that EO 13269 had on non-citizen enlistments. EO 13269 is one of the most visible 
policies affecting non-citizens in the U.S. military and can provide context for the ongoing, 
current debate on non-permanent residents joining the military, as recently proposed by the U.S. 
Congress (although not yet not passed) as part of the Development Relief and Education for 
Alien Minors (DREAM) Act. 
Under current federal law, permanent residents (i.e., those holding green cards), but not 
undocumented aliens, are equally eligible for military service as citizens.  Despite this parity 
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with citizens, only about 0.03 percent of military eligible non-citizens enlist each month, 
compared with an enlistment rate amongst military eligible citizens of 0.06 percent.2 Thus, non-
citizens constitute a significant and potentially underutilized resource in fulfilling the U.S. 
military’s manpower needs.  In addition, non-citizen soldiers have been shown to be better in 
many ways in comparison to their U.S. citizen counterparts, particularly in their speed to 
promotion rates and the percentage of enlistees who complete their initial enlistment obligations 
(Hattiangadi et al., 2005). As former Under Secretary of Defense David Chu stated, “As you can 
see, non-citizens are a vital part of our country’s military […] Non-citizen recruits continue to 
provide the Services with a richly diverse force in terms of race/ethnicity, language, and culture.” 
(Chu, 2006). 
Executive Orders granting expedited U.S. citizenship for military service are not novel -- 
virtually every major conflict in the last century has seen one, including both World Wars, the 
Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Persian Gulf War (Immigration and Nationality Act, 
2011a).  Furthermore, at least 660,000 foreign nationals have received U.S. citizenship for 
military service since the Civil War (Chu, 2006).  However, despite the political (and public) 
popularity of Executive Orders such as 13269, it is theoretically unclear what the effect on 
accessions might be. On one hand, there is a clear new benefit: a decrease in the amount of time 
needed to apply for citizenship. On the other hand, there could be informational content 
contained in the EO as well. For instance, non-citizens may view the EO as a signal of an 
increase in the possibility of going into combat and/or future combat exposure. If this were true, 
then non-citizens may feel that they would receive the brunt of the costs of combat (i.e., difficult 
or dangerous jobs and deployments) and the EO could have a negative effect on enlistments for 
non-citizen recruits. 
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Our empirical approach to uncover the causal effect of EO 13269 uses a difference-in-
differences (DD) model with citizen accessions serving as the counterfactual for non-citizen 
accessions.  We use detailed cross sections of accessions data from the U.S. military’s personnel 
database covering all branches of service between 1999 and 2010.  Under the assumption that the 
EO had no effect on the propensity for U.S. citizens to enlist, citizen accessions in the military 
serve as a valid counterfactual for non-citizen accessions. This assumption is likely justified on 
the grounds that there was no associated benefit or cost of the EO for citizens. 
 Overall, we find little to no effect of the EO on the number of non-citizen accessions. 
However, this overall null effect masks significant heterogeneity across services and recruit 
characteristics. We find evidence that the EO may have incentivized non-citizen recruits to join 
some of the less combat intensive services such as the Air Force and Coast Guard and 
discouraged them from joining the Marines, commonly known to be the most combat intensive 
service. Furthermore, we find that EO 13269 had a positive and significant effect on the number 
of highly educated non-citizen accessions and a negative, non-significant effect on less educated 
non-citizen accessions. There appears to be no difference in the effect of the EO on male and 
female non-citizen accessions.  Finally, we find some evidence that the EO may have had a 
differential effect on the number of non-citizen accessions depending upon race. 
 This paper adds to the literature on recruiting incentives.  This literature has largely focused 
on pay bonuses and other monetary incentives (or disincentives) not related to expediting 
citizenship status (Asch et al., 2010; Dertouzos, 1985; Goldberg and Warner, 1982; Hansen and 
Wenger, 2002 and 2005; Hogan et al., 2005; Hosek and Totten, 2002; Hosek and Martorell, 
2009; Polich 1986; Simon and Warner 2007, 2009, 2010; Simon et al. 2010; Warner and Asch 
1995; Warner et al. 2001). 
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In a related paper on the effect of information on accessions, Christensen (2011) finds that 
increases in causalities in a county leads to lower enlistments from that county.  Two research 
reports have documented the characteristics and outcomes of non-citizens in the U.S. military 
(McIntosh et al. 2004; Hatangati et al. 2005).  However, to our knowledge this is the first study 
to empirically estimate the effect of EO 13269 on non-citizen accessions in the U.S. military. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides institutional details 
about the process for obtaining U.S. citizenship and Executive Order 13269. Section 3 describes 
our data, section 4 outlines the identification strategy, section 5 presents results, and section 6 
concludes. 
 
2. Institutional Details  
The process for attaining U.S. citizenship 
The most common paths to U.S. citizenship for foreign nationals are through family sponsorship 
and military service (U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 2011a). The Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) oversees the application process. In 2010, DHS granted U.S. 
citizenship to a total of 619,913 foreign nationals (Lee 2011). A typical foreign national applying 
for U.S. citizenship, must meet several DHS requirements. The requirements include: being at 
least 18 years of age; holding a green card for at least five years; being able to read, write, and 
speak the English language; being able to demonstrate a basic knowledge of U.S. government 
and history; having continuous residence in the United States, from the date of application until 
the time of naturalization; and being a person of good moral character. 
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 Foreign nationals often encounter delays in their quest for U.S. citizenship, which is mainly 
due to the limited number of green cards that DHS issues per year.3  U.S. law, for example, caps 
the number of family-sponsored green cards at 480,000 per year (Immigration and Nationality 
Act, 2011b). Similarly, U.S. law permits a maximum number of 140,000 employment-sponsored 
green cards, plus any unused family-sponsored applicants from the previous year (Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 2011b). In 2010, the law capped employment-sponsored green cards at 
150,657.  Immediate relatives of U.S. citizens (spouses and children, including orphans adopted 
abroad of U.S. citizens and parents of adult U.S. citizens aged 21 and over) are not subject to the 
family-sponsored cap of 480,000 (Monger and Yankay 2011).  According to DHS figures, 
sponsorship by immediate relatives accounted for 46 percent of the 1,042,625 green cards issued 
in fiscal year 2010 (Monger and Yankay, 2011). In the vast majority of cases, DHS may not 
issue green cards for U.S. military service.4  Permanent residents must first obtain a green card 
through employment, family, or humanitarian means before applying for U.S. military service.  
Following the receipt of their green cards, foreign nationals applying for citizenship 
generally have the same requirements as all applicants, except for a few caveats. The major 
difference across applicants is the duration of the DHS-regulated waiting period. Generally 
speaking, employment-sponsored permanent residents must wait the full mandated five years, 
whereas individuals who are married to U.S. citizens only have to wait three years to be eligible 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Foreign nationals may obtain green cards through a number of channels, such as family sponsorship, employment 
and humanitarian means, including being a victim of human trafficking, refugee, informant, etc. (U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration Services, 2011c).  The processing time varies greatly depending on the type of applicant.  In 
general, family-sponsored green cards take about 11 years to process, whereas employer-sponsored green cards take 
roughly two years (U.S. Department of State, 2011c). According to 2010 DHS figures, after receiving their green 
cards, foreign nationals applying for U.S. citizenship spend a median of six years waiting for the completion of the 
citizenship application process (Lee, 2011). 
4 In 2009, the U.S. DoD implemented a limited pilot program involving 1,000 recruits, which allowed non-green 
card holders to join the U.S. military in order to cover shortages in mission critical areas, such as medical care and 
language interpretation (Gilmore, 2008).  
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for U.S. citizenship application (Lee, 2011).  Other family member-sponsored applicants (such as 
sibling-sponsored applicants) usually have to wait five years. 
The entire timeline for obtaining U.S. citizenship, which includes the time to receive an 
initial green card, the five-year waiting period, and the final citizenship application process, can 
in many instances take decades to complete. The length of time to receive citizenship depends 
largely on the type of applicant and the eligibility requirements in place. Generally speaking, a 
family-sponsored applicant will wait about 17 years to become a U.S. citizen, whereas the 
process for an employer-sponsored applicant takes roughly eight years. The time to receive U.S. 
citizenship for permanent residents serving in the military is similar to that of their civilian 
counterparts; DHS, however, does not require those serving in the U.S. military, to wait the 
mandatory five years as described in Executive Order 13269. 
 
Executive Order 13269 
Prior to Executive Order 13269, which became effective on July 3, 2002, permanent residents 
having served honorably at any time in the Armed Forces of the United States for at least three 
years were eligible to apply for U.S. citizenship (Immigration and Nationality Act, 2011c). This 
was in accordance with Section 328 and 329 of the 1952 Immigration and Naturalization Act. 
Executive Order 13269 modified this act to immediately make military members eligible to 
apply for citizenship after just one day of service.  
Military service members must still meet the other DHS requirements for citizenship, such as 
having the ability to read, write, and speak the English language and having a basic knowledge 
of U.S. government and history. Additionally, the Executive Order did not change the 
naturalization process for military personnel’s family members; DHS still requires military 
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family members to go through the same process prior to the law change. The U.S. president will 
determine the termination of the Executive Order at a later date; currently, it is still in effect. 
 
3. Data 
Our data come from the U.S. military’s personnel database, stored at the Defense Manpower 
Data Center (DMDC).  It contains the monthly aggregate numbers of accessions by both citizens 
and non-citizens, for all branches of the military and in various demographic categories.  
Specifically, we observe two observations per month - one for citizens and one for non-citizens - 
for the following variables: the total number of accessions the military; the number of accessions 
to the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard; the number of accessions 
who are White, Black, Hispanic, and of an “other” race (i.e., not White, Black, or Hispanic); the 
number of male and female accessions; and the number of accessions who had a high school 
diploma or less education and the number of accessions who were college attendees or had more 
education.5 
Our data start in October 1999, the first month in which the citizenship of new accessions 
was recorded, and end in June 2010, the latest date for which data is available.  Table 1 contains 
means of the monthly accession variables we use in our analysis, by citizenship status, prior to 
Executive Order 13269.  Column 1 summarizes accessions for citizens while column 2 
summarizes accessions for non-citizens.  It is immediately clear that far fewer non-citizens join 
the military than do citizens; for example, only 4.3 percent of all accessions prior to July 2002 
were by non-citizens.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Note that U.S. nationals are defined as non-citizens in this database (see 8 U.S.C. § 1408 (INA, 1996, § 1408)); 




The Army draws the most number of enlistees, amongst both citizens and non-citizens, 
followed by the Navy.  Amongst non-citizens, the Marine Corps draws more enlistees than does 
the Air Force, while the opposite is true for citizens. A very small percentage of total accessions 
are to the Coast Guard, comprising an average of 2.3 percent of the total for citizens and 0.6 
percent of the total for non-citizens.  
Over two-thirds of citizen enlistees are White, followed in descending prevalence by Blacks, 
Hispanics, and citizens of other races.  For non-citizens, whites are the least prevalent race (only 
12 percent of the total), perhaps not surprisingly given recent trends in immigration to the U.S.  
Rather, Hispanics are the most prevalent amongst non-citizen enlistees, followed by other races, 
and then Blacks.  The vast majority of both citizen and non-citizen enlistees are male and do not 
have more than a high school education.  
In order to estimate the effect of the EO on the likelihood of enlisting, we normalize the 
number of accessions with estimates of the military eligible population amongst both citizens 
and non-citizens.  While it is not clear what the precise military-eligible population is, we follow 
Hattiangadi et al. (2005) in defining 18-29 year olds residing in the U.S. with a high school 
degree or more education who are in the labor force and are not currently in the military as 
military eligible. We estimate this population using the Current Population Survey (CPS); 
unfortunately, monthly data is not available and thus our measure varies at the year-citizenship 
level.  Using this measure of the military eligible population, there were on average 26.8 million 
eligible citizens and 2.3 million eligible non-citizens living in the U.S. per month prior to July 
2002.  On average, 0.06 percent of eligible citizens and 0.03 percent of eligible non-citizens 
accessed into the U.S. military per month prior to the Executive Order. We note that all of our 
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results below are robust to various other definitions of the military-eligible populations (results 
available upon request). 
Figure 1 plots the numbers of accessions per month by citizens and non-citizens graphically 
over the time period of our study; non-citizen accessions are labeled with the vertical axis on the 
left and citizen accessions are labeled with the vertical axis on the right.  It is clear to see that 
there is seasonality associated with accessions, with large increases in the summer months (after 
High School graduation) and large decreases in the winter.  In our empirical specification below 
we control for this seasonality using month fixed effects.   
 
4. Identification Strategy  
We estimate the effect of the EO on accessions into the military by non-citizens with a standard 
difference-in-differences model: 
          (1) 
where i indexes citizenship status (citizens or non-citizens), t indexes the year-month, 
!""#$$%&'$!"#$#%"&  !"#$%&'(") it is the number of accessions in group i divided by its population base in the 
United States in year t, NonCitizeni is an indicator for non-citizen accessions, POSTt is an 
indicator equal to one for observations in July 2002 and later (after the EO date), Timet is a linear 
time trend, and µt is a vector of month fixed effects.  
The coefficient of interest is β3.  Under the assumptions that (i) the EO did not have any 
effect on citizen accessions, and (ii) there are no time-varying factors other than the EO that 
differentially affect non-citizens and citizens, β3 identifies the effect of EO 13269 on monthly 
non-citizen accessions as a fraction of the eligible population.  For example, β3 > 0 implies that 
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the Executive Order increased non-citizen accessions relative to citizen accessions. In our 
preferred specification, we include month fixed effects to control for the seasonality in 
accessions to the military (and other common shocks over time), as well as pre-and post-EO 
13269 linear time trends that control for differential trends in the number of accessions before 
and after the EO.  
The expected sign of β3 is ambiguous given that there are different channels through which 
the EO can affect one’s likelihood to join the military.  One theory suggests that β3 is positive. 
Predicated on the fact that becoming a U.S. citizen has positive lifetime utility, the reduction in 
the costs of becoming a citizen (i.e., a reduced waiting time) will induce non-citizens to join the 
military. On the other hand, there is certainly information content in the executive order.  It is 
possible that this overt inducement to join the military may be interpreted as a signal that more 
soldiers and sailors are needed, and that non-citizens (relative to citizens) may view the EO as a 
signal of an increase in the possibility of going into combat and/or combat exposure. Previous 
executive orders such as 13269 for non-U.S. citizen military personnel in World War I, World 
War II, Korea, Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf War (Immigration and Nationality Act, 2011a) 
have been implemented during times of increasing tensions throughout conflicts and may be 
viewed as a harbinger for heightened combat activities. If the executive order is viewed as a 
negative signal for things to come, then it is possible that it could act as a deterrent for potential 
non-citizen recruits. 
It is possible that potential citizen recruits may also see informational content in the EO. If 
this were the case, then we would expect to see a shift in their behavior as well; however, as will 
be discussed in the results section, we find no evidence that this occurred.  Furthermore, informal 
conversations with military recruiters leads us to believe (as one would likely suspect) that 
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recruiters did not discuss the new citizenship benefits with citizens, as they do not receive any 
benefits from the order. 
 Finally, our DD identification strategy relies on there being no other policies differentially 
affecting non-citizen accessions that take place at the same as EO 13269.  For instance, if the 
U.S. military decided to increase monetary bonuses for non-U.S. citizen recruits starting around 
the same time as EO, then our estimates would not isolate the independent effect of the EO.  We 
find no evidence in the literature or through personal discussions with recruiters that there were 
any other policies that changed at the same time as the EO and would have differential effects on 
foreign nationals in comparison to U.S. citizens. Furthermore, any recruitment policies that 
affected both U.S. citizens and non-citizens would not bias our results, as the effects of such a 




We first explore the effect of expedited citizenship on total accessions to the military, and later 
explore the heterogeneous effects on various subgroups in the population.  Table 2 contains a 
series of estimates of equation 1, testing the robustness of including various time controls.  
Column 1 contains no time controls and shows the effect of EO 13269 on non-citizen accessions 
is an insignificant increase of 0.000229 percentage points in the proportion of eligible non-
citizens joining the military.  This represents an increase of about 1 percent of the pre-EO 
accession rate of non-citizens (which was 0.03 percent of the eligible population). Given the 
large standard error of the estimate, we cannot reject the hypothesis that EO 13269 had a no 
effect on total non-citizen accessions into the U.S. military.  
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Column 2 includes separate linear time trends pre- and post-EO 13269, column 3 includes 
month fixed effects (FE) which control for the seasonality of recruiting into the military, and 
column 4 includes both the time trends and the month FE.  Comparing across columns, it is clear 
that the inclusion of time controls shrinks the standard errors of the main effect but does not, as 
expected, change the point estimate, as the time controls do not vary with citizenship status.  
Even our preferred estimate in column 4, with the tightest standard errors, does not signal a 
significant change in the proportion of non-citizen recruits into the military as a result of the 
offer of expedited citizenship. 
 
Heterogeneous effects 
The overall null effect of the policy shown in Table 2 masks considerable heterogeneity in who 
is joining the military and to which branches.  Table 3 separates accessions by the five branches 
of service: Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard.  The outcome variable for 
this table is the monthly number of accessions to a specific service divided by the eligible 
military population in that year.  Note that we use the same denominator for creating these 
outcomes as we did for total accessions.  Ideally, this denominator would vary with the eligibility 
requirements of the different services; for example, the education requirement is higher in the 
Air Force and the physical requirement is higher in the Marines than other services and the 
eligible population could be adjusted to reflect these differences. However, the CPS does not 
contain enough detail, and the eligibility requirements are not precise enough to make such a 
calculation practical.  In unreported results, we confirm that the estimated coefficients and 
standard errors are robust to other reasonable definitions of the eligible population.  Furthermore, 
while not shown, all regressions control for month FE and pre- and post-EO time trends. 
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The effect of EO 13269 on accessions into the Army and Navy are insignificantly different 
from zero; however, the point estimates are of opposite signs, with a decrease in accessions in 
the Army and an increase in the Navy.  Interestingly, there are strong and significant effects for 
the Air Force, Marines, and Coast Guard: accession rates amongst non-citizens increased by 
0.000988 percentage points for the Air Force, increased by 0.000320 percentage points for the 
Coast Guard, and decreased by 0.000177 percentage points for the Marines.  A clear pattern 
emerges from these results: the EO seems to have increased accessions into the non-combat 
intensive services (the Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard) while decreasing accessions into 
combat intensive services (Army and Marines). 
These results suggest that there must be some signaling component in the EO for non-
citizens: the increased need for recruits prompted an inducement for a specific group (non-
citizens) and also coincides with the time period of increased combat intensity for ground forces, 
the Army and Marines.  We cannot, however, tell whether the EO induced switching between 
services amongst non-citizens who would have joined anyway, or whether those induced to join 
the less combat intensive branches were different from those induced to join the more combat 
intensive branches. 
 We observe more of these differential effects when looking at accessions by members of 
different racial/ethnic groups, males versus females, and those with more education versus less 
education in Table 4.  As before, the outcome is the monthly accessions amongst each group 
divided by the eligible population.  Again as before, the CPS does not allow us to identify the 
eligible population amongst each specific demographic group and we continue to normalize by 
the eligible population that varies at the year-citizenship level.  Looking at columns 1 through 4, 
we see that there are strong and opposite effects of the EO for accessions by White and Black 
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non-citizens compared to Hispanic non-citizens and non-citizens of other races.  For example, 
White non-citizen accessions as a percentage of the eligible population increase by 0.00528 
percentage points while the ratio for Hispanic accessions decreases by 0.00311 percentage 
points.  
 Columns 5 and 6 of Table 4 show that there are small and insignificant effects of expedited 
citizenship for male and female non-citizens; however, the point estimates are consistent with a 
story in which males know that they have a much higher chance than females of being placed in 
combat intensive positions.  Finally, columns 7 and 8 show the effect of the EO for non-citizens 
with different levels of education.   There is a small negative and insignificant effect for those 
with a high school degree or less.  For those who have attended any college of more education, 
there is a significant effect of 0.000659 percentage points.  Again, these results are consistent 
with the fact that the more educated are more likely to take skilled jobs that are not on the front 
lines, leaving the combat intensive jobs, such as infantry in the Army or Marine Crops, to the 
less educated.  
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have provided the first empirical estimates of the effect of offering expedited 
citizenship to non-citizens who join the U.S. military.  We study Executive Order (EO) 13269, 
which decreased the waiting time to apply for citizenship from 3 years to one day upon joining 
the military, and find that it had no significant effect on the overall number of non-citizen 
accessions as a percentage of the military eligible population.  However, this null effect masks 
important and significant heterogeneity in the effect of the EO across accessions into various 
service branches.  Specifically, the EO appears to have induced fewer accessions by non-citizens 
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into combat intensive services and more accessions into the “safer,” less combat intensive 
services.  In addition, we find differential effects of the policy across races and levels of 
education including evidence that the EO induced more accessions by White and Black non-
citizens, fewer accessions by non-citizen Hispanics and other races, and more accessions by non-
citizens with a college education. These results are consistent with the theory that the EO 
(overtly) signaled an increased demand for non-citizens in the military, while (perhaps less 
overtly) signaling that these non-citizens would be placed in combat intensive situations. 
 While there is certainly a moral argument to be made for the expedited citizenship of 
permanent residents in the U.S. military, it does not appear that the EO had any noticeable effect 
on overall non-citizen accessions. If the U.S. military would like to induce more non-citizens 
into service, then they will likely have to provide larger benefits in terms of monetary 
compensation or possibly even consider offering more non-traditional benefits such as those 
discussed in the DREAM Act, which would allow non-permanent residents to enlist. Current 
research in this area is sparse and this study provides context for the ongoing debate on non-
citizen enlistment policies. We believe further research on this subject and others closely related 
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Table 2: The effect of Executive Order 13269 on accessions by non-citizens into t he U.S. milrtary. 
Total monthly Total monthly Total month ly Total monthly 
accessions I accessions I accessions I accessions I 
Outcome • Eligible population Eligible population Eligible population Eligible population 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Non-citizen x POST 2.29e-06 2.29e-06 2.29e-06 2.29e-06 
(3.83e-OS) (2.Ue-OS) (3.81e-OS) (2.tle-OS) 
POST -7.93e-OS"" .s.97e-os••• 3.30e-OS 1.88e-06 
(3.38e-OS) (1.88e-OS) (S.Ue-OS) (3.22e-OS) 
Non-citizen -0.0002s2••• .o.0002s2••• .o.0002s2••• .o.0002s2••• 
(3.Sle-OS) (1.87e-OS) (3.SOe-OS) (1.87e-OS) 
Constant o.ooos77t:•11 OJXIOGS311• 11 OJXIOS4911a 11 OJXIOG2911• 11 
(3.08e-OS) (2.Ue-OS) (4.36e-OS) (2.94e-OS) 
Year-month FE yes yes 
Pre and post linear time trends yes yes 
Observations 258 258 258 258 
R·squared 0 .606 0 .856 0 .625 0.869 
Notes: • • • p<0.01, •• p<0.05, • p<O. l 
(1) Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
(2) POST equals one for months after and lncludingJu.ly 2002, the month In which Executive Order 13269 was signed Into 
law. 
(3) The military eligible population varies at the year·cltizenshlp level; It Is calcu.lated from CPS data and defined as the 
number of 18·29 years residing in the U.S. with a hlgti. school degree or more education who a re In the labor force a nd are 




Table 3: Effects of Executive Order 13269 by bra nch of service. 
Outcome • Montly accessions to Army Navy 
the ... I Eligible population Air Force Marines Coast Guard 
1 2 3 4 5 
Non-citizen x POST -2.65...oG 9.SGe-06 9.88e-06"• -1 .77e-os• •• 3.20e·06""" 
(1.21e·05) (6.05e-06) (4.15 ... 06) (3.40e-06) (7.48e-07) 
POST 1.02e·OS · 2.57e-Os"•" 4.37e-06 1.29e-0s••" 1.41e-07 
(1.93e·05) (8.15e-06) (6.78 ... 06) (4.52e-06) (1.17e-06) 
Non-citizen -0.000111··· ·S.07e-OS"•" ·7.39e-OS"•" -3.30e-os• •• -l.13e-os• •• 
(1.06e·05) (5.42e-06) (3.47 ... 06) (2.66e-06) (6.84e-07) 
Constant 0.000219•"• 0.000183•"• 0.000101··· 0.000110··· 1.39e·OS"•" 
(1 .73c OS) (8 .6Se OG) (S.38c 06) (4.94c 06) (1.38c 06) 
Observations 258 158 258 258 258 
R-sguared 0.778 0.797 0.850 0.860 0.824 
Notes: ··· p<O.OL, •• p<0.05, • p<O.l 
(1) Robust standa.rd errors In parentheses. AO regressions Jn:Jude year-month fll(ed effects and pre-- and post·el(erutive 
order II near time trend.s. 
(2) POST equa.ls one for months after and Including July 2002, the month In which £l(erutive Order 13269 was sfgned 
Into law. 
(3) The mUltary eligible population varies at the year·cltiie~hlp revel; It Is cakulated from CPS data and defined as the 
number of 18·29 yea.rs residing In the U.S. with a high schoc·I degree or more ed1.1Catlon who are Jn the labor force and 
are not currently In the military. 
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